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A critical problem surrounding the rebuilding of American cities is
the resulting dislocation of lower-income residents to whom urban
dwellings "filter" down.' After rehabilitation has occurred, the prior
low-income occupants must compete for the restored shelter with
persons of higher income whom the restoration was designed to attract.2
Their lack of economic means to compete causes the seemingly unjust
result of dislocation. The alternative is to prevent economic competition
in the housing market, thus dampening incentive to return capital
investment to the cities. 3 In Boston, demand from both high- and low-
income persons has raised rents and increased the incentive to
rehabilitate older homes. 4 Rent control legislation was enacted to shield
the low-income residents from the higher rents resulting from this
demand. 5 In Mayo v. Boston Rent Control Administrator6 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the intent of this act was also
to protect low-income tenants from the threat of eviction for
1. See R. WEAVER, DILEMMAS OF URBAN AMERICA 69-72 (1965). See also B. BARRON & E.
BARRON, THE INHUMANITY OF URBAN RENEWAL (1965). "Filtering" describes the process by
which housing is passed from higher to lower income groups as it ages. This phenomenon
has occurred in American cities as wealthier groups migrated to the suburbs. D.
MANDELKER & R. MONTGOMERY, HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 225-26
(1973). See Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability
Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALIF.
L. REV. 1098, 1117-18 (1975).
2. See R. WEAVER, supra note 1.
3. Rent control has been shown to halt capital investment in housing. For example,
while rent control was maintained in France no new housing was constructed. F. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 344 (1972). Recently the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development, in basic agreement with the findings of the French
study, issued a statement that "local rent control [in the United States] is a significant
factor in causing owners of FHA projects, especially subsidized projects, to default on their
mortgage payments." HUD Press Release No. R-75-314 (Feb. 26, 1975). See also Kosoff,
Incentives for Urban Apartment Construction, 32 AM. J. EcON. & SOCIOLOGY 295 (1973).
Rent control has been considered a deterrent to renovation as well as to construction of
housing: "[building codes] and rent controls were two causes for owners' hesitancy to
remodel in New York City. Simultaneously, ability to free buildings from controls by
demolition and rebuilding encouraged the leveling of many fine residences." C. ABRAMS,
THE CITY IS THE FRONTIER 190 (1965).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETrS HOUSING MARKEr 6-7 (1971).
5. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, [1970] Mass. Act & Resolves 732.
6. -Mass. -, 314 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1974).
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rehabilitation. In doing so it focused on the conflict between reasonably
priced housing for low-income people and the need and cost of
rehabilitation as a housing strategy.
In Mayo an apartment building owner applied to the Boston Rent
Control Administrator for certificates of eviction against twenty-one
tenants under Section 9(a)(10) of the Massachusetts Rent Control Act,
which permits eviction for "just cause."'7 The landlord planned to
renovate the apartments, located in an urban renewal area, from low-
and moderate- to high-income dwellings. The Administrator's al-
lowance of the landlord's request8 was reversed by the housing court,
which held that eviction for optional upgrading was inconsistent with
the Act's purpose of assuring housing for low- and moderate-income
families.9 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
housing court decision.'0
At common law a landlord holding a fee simple subject to a leasehold
could evict a tenant upon expiration of the lease." This right, however,
7. (a) No person shall bring any action to recover possession of a controlled rental
unit unless: ... the landlord seeks to recover possession for any other just cause,
provided that his purpose is not in conflict with the provisions and purposes of this
act.
Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, § 9(a)(10), [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 737.
8. The landlord argued that the Boston Redevelopment Authority threatened to take his
building by eminent domain unless renovations were accomplished and that therefore he
was obliged to renovate - Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 120. His building consisted of 51
units, 31 of which were not controlled and had already been renovated. The landlord
wanted to vacate the remaining twenty controlled units in order to renovate them. Id. at -,
314 N.E.2d at 120. Afterwards, the rents would have been raised$120 per month to cover the
cost of renovation. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 122.
9. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 119 (1974) (lower court decision unreported).
10. Id.
11. 1 AMERICAN LAWOF PROPERTY §3.36 (A. Casnered. 1952). See also Pernellv. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974). When a lessee remains after the lease has expired, and the lessor
elects not to treat him as tenant, he becomes a tenant at sufferance. Margosian v.
Markarian, 288 Mass. 197, 192 N.E. 612 (1934). The landlord's usual remedy is to recover in
assumpsit the fair rental value of the property. Arnold Realty Co. v. William K. Toole Co.,
46 R.I. 204, 208, 125 A. 363,365 (1924). He can also recover special damages for the lessee's
breach of his duty to surrender possession. McCullagh v. GoodyearTire & Rubber Co., 342
Mich. 244, 69 N.W.2d 731 (1955).
Two exceptions to the landlord's remedies existed at common law. During a housing
shortage in 18th century Ireland, the "equity right to renewal" arose. This prevented an
Irish tenant paying a fair rent from being ousted by someone willing to pay more. The
same right developed in Europe during the Middle Ages for the benefit of Jews, who,
unable to own property, could be threatened with eviction to obtain higher rents. Cohen,
Rent Control After World War I - Recollections, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 273-74 (1946).
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could be limited by the state under the police power. 2 State intervention
in landlord-tenant relations began in the early twentieth century3 and
shared a common rationale with state intervention in other commercial
activities. 4
The first rent control laws appeared during post-World War I housing
shortages. 5 Rents were regulated by postponing for the duration of the
12. All property is held subject to the right of the state to regulate its use under the police
power. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E.
390 (1889); Ruona v. City of Billings, 136 Mont. 554, 323 P.2d 29 (1958). Zoning is an
example of police power authority over real property. See I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING § 2.06 (1968).
13. The first regulations in the housing field were housing codes. L. FRIEDMAN,
GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 25-39 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding the regulation of grain
storage rates). See also Foster, The Doctrine of the United States Supreme Court of
Property Affected by a Public Interest, and Its Tendencies, 5 YALE L.J. 49 (1895). Prior to
this time business was controllable only if it had received some special favor, such as a tax
exemption, a franchise, or power of eminent domain. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908); Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 206 U.S. 496 (1907);
In re Mayor of the City of New York, 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892). If a particular
enterprise vital to the public welfare monopolized its field, or otherwise overreached, the
legislature would deem it "affected with a public interest" and subject to regulation. See
Goble, Are Property Interests Secure?, 9 Ky. L.J. 149 (1920-21). The basis for this
intervention in the free market was the government's need to protect its citizenry when the
laws of supply and demand broke down. Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 605-06, 118 P. 80,
83 (1911):
[W]henever, through changed social conditions, or otherwise, a business
becomes essentially public in character and assumes proportions, takes on features,
or is attended by consequences which make free participation in it destructive of the
ends for which it is pursued and a menace to the welfare of society, society, through
its duly constituted authorities, may, in the absence of constitutional prohibitions,
protect itself by limiting the right to engage in such business, as far as may be
necessary to attain the desired security.
In effect, the states imposed a fictitious public trust on businesses characterized to be
performing a state function. Courts upheld the constitutionality of this exercise of the
police power by concluding that to the extent a business was "public," it was not protected
by the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts, German Alliance
Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Golden v. State, 133 Cal. App. 2d 640, 285 P.2d 49
(Dist. Ct. App. 1955); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; or the taking of private property without due
process, Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
15. E.g., Ball Rent Act of 1919, ch. 80, 41 Stat. 298; Law of April 1, 1920, chs. 130-39,
11920] Laws of N.Y. 224-32. Since 1919 many rent control statutes have been enacted at
various times to meet immediate housing problems. See note 20 infra. The broadest
measure was a national federal regulation during and after World War II. See note22 infra.
From 1953, when the last federal act terminated, until 1969, New York was the only area to
have rent control. Now rent control exists in Massachusetts through a state enabling act,
Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 732, and in New Jersey and
Florida by local initiative. See Blumberg, Municipal Rent Control Upheld by New Jersey
Supreme Court, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 83, 84 (1973); Indritz, The Tenants' Rights
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shortage a landlord's right to bring an action of ejectment against a
tenant and by allowing a defense of "unfairness" to a landlord's action
for rent.16 The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the
constitutionality of a Washington, D.C., rent control regulation on the
ground that the extreme shortage and the vital necessity of housing was a
matter that "affected [it] with a public interest.' 7 The Court warned,
however, that the bar to evictions was non-confiscatory only as a
temporary response to an emergency situation. 8
The Supreme Court later dropped the "affected with a public interest"
rationale and justified the regulation of both rents and evictions solely
on the basis of the emergency police power.19 Thus, every rent control act
has been introduced by a declaration of emergency, and in almost every
case each has been upheld on this basis.2 0 To be a reasonable exercise of
Movement, 1 NEw MEXICO L. REv. 1, 63 (1971); Sternlieb & Brody, Pitfalls in Rent
Control, 4 REAL ESTATE REv. No. 2, at 120, 121 (1974).
16. E.g., Law of April 1, 1920, ch. 136, [1920] Laws of N.Y. 228. The statute controlled
rents by allowing a judge to fix a fair amount when a landlord brought an action for rent.
To be effective a rent control statute must also control evictions, otherwise a landlord
would be able to obtain a rent raise by threatening eviction.
17. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). The Supreme Courtj ustified rent rate regulation
on the same basis that it had previously justified the regulation of business in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). See Note, Residential Rent Control in New York City, 3
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 30, 31 (1967); text at note 14 supra.
Opponents of rent control argued that limitation of a landlord's right to lease his
apartment to the tenant of his choice would impair his freedom to contract and that this
limitation on the use of his property amounted to a taking without due process.
Wickersham, The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws, 69 U. PA. L.
REv. 301 (1921); 34 HARv. L. REv. 426 (1921). One commentator, however, felt that the rent
control statutes did not impair contracts or deprive of property without due process
because: 1) there is no vested right in an ejection remedy; 2) a contract for rent procured by
duress is unenforceable; and 3) when a contract is voidable by duress, the measure of
recovery is the reasonable value of the use and occupation. Aron, The New York Landlord
and Tenant Laws of 1920, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 (1920). See generally Boyd, Rent
Regulation Under the Police Power, 19 MICH. L. REv. 599 (1921); 9 CALIF. L. REV. 337
(1920).
18. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921): "A limit in time, to tide over a passing
trouble, may well justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change."
19. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242(1922). The Supreme Court in Levy
followed the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in People ex rel. Durham Realty
Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 665 (1922),
to justify rent and eviction control. The main difference between Levy and Block is the
expansion in Levy of the states' police power to control any business during an emergency.
See Note, Residential Rent Control in New York City, supra note 17, at 31-32.
20. For example, each of the following acts states the existence of emergency housing
conditions, and the constitutionality of each was upheld on this basis: Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, upheld in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944), Emergency Commercial Space Rent Control Law of 1945, ch. 3, [1945] Laws of
[Vol. 11:319
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the police power, however, the acts must allow evictions under certain
limited circumstances, 2' such as for the personal use of the landlord, for
the removal of an objectionable tenant, or for withdrawal from the
housing market.22
N.Y. 11, upheld in Finn v. 415 Fifth Ave. Co., 153 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S.
838 (1946); An Act Relative to Rent Control, ch. 434, § 1, [ 1953] Mass. Acts & Resolves 338,
upheld in Russell v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 331 Mass. 501, 120 N.E.2d 388 (1954).
"[W]e consider the contract clause and the decisions which have expounded it in harmony
with the essential reserved power of the States to protect the security of their peoples ... 
Home Bldg. 8, Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1934).
Courts will usually not question these declarations. See Amsterdam-Manhattan, Inc. v.
City Rent : Rehabilitation Administration, 15 N.Y.2d 1014,207 N.E.2d616, 260 N.Y.S.2d
23 (1965) (mem.), aff'g 21 App. Div. 2d 965,252 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'g43 Misc.
2d 889,252 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (upholding the existence of an emergency housing
situation in New York twenty years after it was declared). But see Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924), in which an action contesting extension of the Ball Rent Act
of Aug. 24, 1921, ch. 91, 42 Stat. 200, was remanded to determine the current existence of an
emergency- "A law depending upon the existence of an emergency or other certain state of
facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases ... " 264 U.S. at 547. See
also Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 49 Cal. App. 3d 464, 122 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Dist. Ct. App.
1975), in which the court, relying on Chastleton, recently struck down a municipal rent
control ordinance. The court found that no emergency existed and criticized the
ordinance's failure to provide a definite termination point, thereby creating a permanent
emergency. It also denied the city's contention that rent control should be upheld if
supported simply by a rational basis. This decision might heralda new willingness on the
part of the judiciary to question the careless use of the word "emergency" on the part of the
legislatures. See Baar g. Keeting, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process -
The Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Control, 7 URBAN LAW. 447 (1975) (a
criticism of the retention of the requirement of an emergency as a holdover from the days of
substantive due process).
21. See Rivera v. R. Cobian Chinea & Co., 181 F.2d 974 (1st Cir. 1950) (holding
unconstitutional an order prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant in order to return
the rooms to his own use); Taylor v. Bowles, 145 F.2d 833 (Emer. Ct. App. 1944) (affirming
a landlord's right to evict his tenants if he wishes to remove his building from the housing
market); Wilson v. McDonnell, 265 F. 432 (D.C. Cir. 1919), appeal dismissed, 257 U.S. 665
(1921) (striking down a complete bar to eviction on due process and equal protection
grounds).
22. Rivera v. R. Cobian Chinea 9: Co., 181 F.2d 974 (Ist Cir. 1950); Taylorv. Bowles, 145
F.2d 833 (Emer. Ct. App. 1944); Willson v. McDonnell, 265 F. 432 (D.C. Cir. 1919). See also
Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, -.Mass. -, 326 N.E.2d 876(1975), in which the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down a rent control regulation
prohibiting landlords from turning their apartments into condominiums as without the
statutory authority of the Rent Control Board. These exceptions may be enlarged or
restricted only according to the purpose of the statute. For example, post-World War II
rent control statutes in New York have narrowly limited a landlord's ability to evict
tenants in order to take his buildings off the housing market. See Loab Estates, Inc. v.
Druhe, 300 N.Y. 176, 90 N.E.2d 25 (1949) (forbidding a landlord from removing his
apartments from the housing market unless he has relocated his tenants in similar quarters
at the same rent). Another common exception to the prohibition against eviction is
renovation and alteration. Sometimes this exception is only qualified by a "good faith"
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In 1969 the Massachusetts legislature passed a rent control enabling
act 23 which declared the existence of an emergency housing shortage
threatening the public health, safety and welfare. This emergency
consisted of a "shortage of rental housing accommodations for families
of low and moderate income and abnormally high rents," caused by
housing demolition and deterioration, and insufficient new housing.24
The Act set maximum rents at the rate charged six months prior to its
enactment, subject to adjustment in order to provide a "fair net
operating income."2 5 Eviction is permitted only after issuance of a
certificate by the Administrator upon proof of certain conditions, 26
requirement, as under the regulations for Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26,56
Stat. 23. See Webb v. Goforth, 27 Tenn. App. 595,183 S.W.2d312 (1944) (allowing landlord
to evict in order to remodel, as long as in good faith, notwithstanding herpurpose to raise
rental income thereby). Often, however, eviction for renovation is allowed only when
"reasonably necessary to protect and conserve the housing accommodations." Housing
and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, 61 Stat. 193,200. See also 23 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 503,505-06(1948)
(criticizing the Housing and Rent Act of 1948, ch. 161, 62 Stat. 93, for allowing eviction for
renovation even if not necessary for maintenance). For eviction provisions in various rent
control laws see B. FRIEDLANDER & A. CURRERI, RENT CONTROL: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
MUNICIPAL (1948). The Ball Rent Act, upheld in Block, also provided exceptions to its
eviction restriction for personal occupancy and for razing the building in order to
construct new rental property. Ball Rent Act of 1919, ch. 80, § 109, 41 Stat. 297, 301.
23. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842,[1970] Mass. Acts& Resolves 732. The statute resulted in
part from the invalidation of a Brookline rent control ordinance on the ground of state
preemption. Marshall House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd., 357 Mass. 709, 260
N.E.2d 200 (1970). In Marshall House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd., 358 Mass. 686,266 N.E.2d
876 (1971), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of
the 1969 Rent Control Act.
24. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, § 1, [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 732.
25. Id. §§ 6, 7, [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 737.
26. Evictions. (a) No person shall bring any action to recover possession of a
controlled rental unit unless:
(I) the tenant has failed to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled;
(2) the tenant has violated an obligation or covenant of his tenancy other than the
obligation to surrender possession upon proper notice and has failed to cure such
violation after having received written notice thereof from the landlord;
(3) the tenant is committing or permitting to exist a nuisance in, or is causing
substantial damage to, the controlled rental unit, or is creating a substantial
interference with the comfort, safety, or enjoyment of the landlord or other
occupants of the same or any adjacent accommodation;
(4) the tenant is convicted of using or permitting a controlled rental unit to be
used for any illegal purpose;
(5) the tenant, who had a written lease or rental agreement which terminated on
or after this act has taken effect in a city or town, has refused, afterwritten request or
demand by the landlord, to execute a written extension or renewal thereof for a
further term of like duration and in such terms that are not inconsistent with or
violative of any provisions of this act;
(6) the tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the unit for the
purpose of making necessary repairs or improvements required by the laws of the
United States, the commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, or for the
purpose of inspection as permitted or required by the lease or by law, or for the
purpose of showing the rental unit to any prospective purchaser or mortgagee;
[Vol. 11:319
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Mayo dealt with an application under the provision allowing the
landlord to evict for "just cause" if his purposes do not conflict with the
purpose of the Act,27 and necessitated an interpretation of those
purposes.2 8 The Supreme Judicial Court first affirmed the housing
court's findings that extensive renovation required the vacating of the
units, but that renovation of the apartments was unnecessary to keep the
building in the housing market.29 The inquiry then became "whether
evictions may be ordered, not for necessary maintenance, but for-
optional upgrading of the apartments."3 0 The court's answer was
syllogistic (1) the purpose of the Act is to preserve and expand the
supply of low- and moderate-income housing;3' (2) renovation would
(7) the person holding at the end of a lease term is a subtenant not approved by the
landlord;
(8) the landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy of
himself, or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-
in-law, or daughter-in-law;
(9) the landlord seeks to recover possession to demolish or otherwise remove the
unit from housing use; and
(10) the landlord seeks to recover possession for any other just cause, provided
that his purpose is not in conflict with the provisions and purposes of this act.
Id. § 9, [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 737. For cases other than Mayo construing this section
see Zussman v. Rent Control Bd., -Mass. -, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975) (§ 9(a)(10)); Gentilev.
Rent Control Bd., -. Mass. -, 312 N.E.2d 210 (1974) (§9(a)(1)). Seealso Trovatov.Walsh,
-, Mass. -, 295 N.E.2d 899 (1973).
27. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, v 9(a)(10), [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 737.
28. The Housing Court of the City of Boston has original jurisdiction over complaints
filed against the Boston Rent Control Administrator. This court has de novo review over
the Administrator's decisions because they are not determined in a judicial proceeding and
therefore do not satisfy due process hearing requirements. -. Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at
119. See 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRAnIE L&w TREATISE § 29.07 (1958). State and federal courts
have uniformly held that availability of de novo judicial review satisfies this due process
requirement of a hearing. Ewing v. Mytinger& Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Hagar v.
Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701(1884); Horseman Dollsv. Unemployment Compensation
Comm'n, 7 N.J. 541,82 A.2d 177 (1951); Mallattv. Luihn, 206 Ore. 678,294 P.2d871 (1956).
1 K. DAvIs, supra, § 7.10. A few months prior to Mayo in Gentile v. Rent Control Bd., -
Mass. - 312 N.E.2d 210 (1974), the Supreme judicial Court found that the hearing before
the Rent Control Board of Somerville was not determinative, since it was not mandatory
under the Rent Control Act, nor was the Rent Control Board an agency under the
Administrative Procedure Act, MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 30A, § 1 (1973), qualifiedto conduct
an official hearing. The court held that if any relevant disputed factual issues were resolved
by the Rent Control Board the district court should decide such questions after a trial
unaffected by the decision of the board. - Mass. at - , 312 N.E.2d at 215. The
characterization of the hearing as nonjudicial in Mayo allowed the housing court to base
its decision on its own findings rather than thoseof the Administrator. -. Mass. at -, 314
N.E.2d at 119. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of the decision see55 B.U.L. REV.
437, 449-63 (1975).
29. - Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 122.
30. Id.
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raise the rent by $120; and (3) eviction, therefore, violates the purpose of
the Act.32 Thus the court acted to prevent the immediate removal of the
low- and moderate-income units from the housing market.
The dissent supported the Administrator's decision to allow eviction,
on the grounds that renovation did not conflict with the purpose of the
Act, prevention of necessary renovation would deprive the landlord of
property without compensation, and placement of the burden of
remedying the housing shortage exclusively on the landlord would be
inequitable and inefficient as a housing strategy. 33
Although both the dissent and the majority looked to the declaration
of emergency 34 to discern the legislature's intent and agreed on the need
for low- and moderate-income housing, the dissent found sufficient
justification for the Administrator's approval of the eviction.35 The fact
that condemnation proceedings had not been instituted did not preclude
the Administrator from finding a need for renovation, under the
dissent's view. Given this need, the Administrator would be conforming
to the purposes of the Act by permitting the landlord to construct luxury
units instead of risking the total loss of the apartments through
deterioration.3 6
The dissent also argued that a constitutional issue was raised by the
majority result-whether the impairment of the right to evict
constituted a taking of property without compensation.37 This was
31. The court supported its identification of the purpose of the 1970 Act by pointing to
the addition of the words "low and moderate income," which were not included in the
original 1969 version. - Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 121-22. See note 23 supra.
32. - Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 122.
33. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 123-28.
34. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, § 1, [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 732.
35. The dissent found that since the housing emergency (as listed by the legislature) was
*caused by insufficient housing and housing deterioration, then housing renovation must
be within the purpose of the Act: "[W]e cannot ignore the conditions that led to the
housing shortage .... The administrator may well have reasoned that denial of the
certificates would have aggravated the very conditions that caused the shortage .....-
Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 127 (dissenting opinion).
36. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 126-27. The dissent added: "[T]here is nothing in the act
indicating an intention to restrict the expansion of the higher income housing market."
Id. at - ,314 N.E.2d at 127. The purpose of exempting newly constructed or rehabilitated
buildings from rent control is to provide an incentive for landlords to increase the housing
supply. See Willis, The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1118,
1121 (1947). Although the Massachusetts Rent Control Act did not contain an exemption
for renovation, the Administrator interpreted the "just cause" provision to remove from
rent control any building that is rehabilitated at a cost of more than $10,000 per unit, or is
substantially "as good as new." Brief for Dorchester Tenants Council asAmicus Curiaeat
405, Mayo v. Boston Rent Control Adm'r, -. Mass. -_, 314 N.E.2d 118 (1974).
37. __ Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 123. Although rent control acts have been upheld as a
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premised on the fact that there is a point beyond which any exercise of
the police power "goes too far" and becomes a taking, 8 considering the
nature of the affected right, the harshness of the restriction imposed, and
the degree of emergency. 9 Balancing these factors, the dissent found that
the degree of emergency did not warrant the restriction on the right
involved, viewing the right to use private property as basic.40 The
conclusion of the dissent was that the denial had the effect of converting
the landlord's apartments into public housing, an action which
required compensation.4 1
proper exercise of the police power (see notes 19-20 and accompanying text supra), rent
control would not be constitutional in every situation. E.g., Rivera v. R. Cobian Chinea &8
Co., 181 F.2d 971 (st Cir. 1950). Many others have posed the same question. See Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 I.S. 503,529 (1944) (dissenting opinion); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921) (dissenting opinion). See also Wickersham, The Police
Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 301 (1921); 34 HARV. L.
REv. 126 (1921).
The Mayo dissent relied on zoning cases to support its argument. - Mass. at -_, 314
N.E.2d at 125. Zoning, like prohibitions on evictions, is a police power restriction on a
landowner's use of his property. An overly-restrictive zoning measure will be struck down
as a taking. Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); City of Akron v. Chapman,
160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953). The dissent argued that the majority's decision
resulted in a similar overrestriction on the use of defendant's property, and thus a taking.
The dissent failed, however, to account for the distinction that while both zoning and
eviction co ntrol are exercises of the police power, the latter is also justified by emergency
conditions. See text at notes 23-24 supra.
38. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In this case the Court
struck down as a taking a law prohibiting the mining of coal underneath houses. The law
was passed after defendant had sold plaintiff the right to mine under his house. Prior to
Pennsylvania Coal mere regulation of property use was not considered a taking. See
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
39. -Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 125-26.
10. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 125. Freedom to own private property is the basis of our
ccnomic and political systems. See generally F. HAYEK, supra note 3.
11. -Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 125. To support this result the dissent citedRivera v. R.
Cobian Chinea & Co., 181 F.2d 974 (1st Cir. 1950), which held unconstitutional a rent
control law banning all evictions. The dissent failed, however, to cite other cases striking
down partial eviction restrictions. Actually, similar restrictions have been upheld. Levin v.
Mede, 189 Misc. 852,855,72 N.Y.S.2d 669,673 (City of New York Mun. Ct. 1947), decided
under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, 61 Stat. 196, held that "tenants can be
dispossessed only if the premises in question are a hazard to the health and safety of the
occupants or the surrounding area and the altering or remodeling cannot be performed
with the tenants in possession." Post v. Cashin, 323 Mass. 316, 81 N.E.2d 842 (1948),
upheld the 1947 federal restriction on eviction to renovate and subdivide when not
reasonably necessary to protect and conserve the accommodations. Many laws have
forbidden evictions for renovation, optional or otherwise. E.g., Law of April 1, 1920, ch.
136. [19201 Laws of N.Y. 228. See also note 22 supra.
The dissent also noted that denying the eviction certificates left the landlord with an
indefinite choice between demolishing the building or letting it fall into disrepair.
Mass. at -, 311 N.E.2d at 127. The Act was to expire on December 31, 1975, but could be
extended indefinitely. Governor Dukakis has enforced a permanent extension. 2 HOUSING
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The equity and efficiency of the majority opinion may be questioned
on its finding that renovation was not necessary.42 To require an
apartment owner to surrender the right to improve his property in favor
of a tenant who holds no vested interest is to place on him the burden of
resolving society's housing problem. The dissent warned that a strong
desire to improve a public condition does not justify a denial of the
usufructs of private property.4 3
The majority failed to consider the constitutional and policy issues
raised by the dissent.44 Accordingly, the landlord's interests were found
not to be unconstitutionally or unfairly restricted as he still was left with
reasonable use of his property. The landlord could continue to rent his
apartments, receiving the "fair net operating income" guaranteed under
the Act.45 The court found that emergency conditions in the area of low-
and moderate-income housing took priority over maximization of the
landlord's profits. 46 It directed that "desirability" arguments be
& DEV. REP. 1011 (1975). But see Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 49 Cal. App. 3d 464, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also note 20supra. Under the analysis of the Birkenfeld
court, the permanent extension of the rent control statute would be of doubtful
constitutional validity.
Technically, the land lord has four options: personal use, use for a nonhousing purpose,
demolition, or continued rental. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, §§ 9(a)(8)-(9), [1970] Mass.
Acts & Resolves 737. The dissent argued that only the third choice is realistically open to
the landlord. - Mass. at , 314 N.E.2d at 125.
The severity of the "emergency" was also questioned. The dissent compared the 1969
emergency with the World War 11 emergency when virtually all nonwar related
construction was stopped. Id. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 123-24.
42. "In the face of a public emergency in the area of housing, the fundamental question
is on whom the burden... should fall.... [Tihe landlord here is being told to shoulder
an unfair share of the burden." - Mass. at -, 314 N.E.2d at 127-28.
43. Id. at , 314 N.E.2d at 128.
44. One possible reason is that the Massachusetts court did not want to raise a federal
question open for United States Supreme Court review, since the Supreme Court is
relatively more conservative than the Massachusetts court. See Israel v. City Rent &.
Rehabilitation Administration, 285 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), which found no
substantial federal question in a complaint challenging rent control on due process, equal
protection, or impairment of contract grounds. The court also denied relief under the civil
rights statutes because complainant failed to show a purposeful deprivation of
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court, however, has not reviewed rent control since its
decision in United States v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, Inc., 338 U.S. 897 (1952),
and does not seem likely to do so now. See Siegel, Constitutionality of the Housing and
Rent Act of 1949, 11 FED. B.J. 47 (1950).
45. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, § 7, [1970] Mass. Acts & Resolves 735.
46. - Mass, at , 314 N.E.2d at 123. The court infers that since the landlord receives a
"fair net operating income" according to a statute which has been held constitutional, he
is not entitled to a greater profit, and therefore any arguments that he should receive one
are "'desirability" or policy arguments and should be directed toward the legislature. Cf.
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addressed to the legislature and not the court.47
Rent control as a housing strategy attempts to provide a temporary
solution to a housing shortage. 8 There is a presumption that demand
has driven prices to an excessive level, 49 allowing rents to be stabilized
without depriving the landlord of a fair return on his investment.50
Some studies show, however, that elimination of the profit margin of the
tenement landlord causes housing deterioration and abandonment.5'
The long term effect of the regulation is to discourage investment of
capital for expansion and renovation of housing supplies and thus to
exacerbate any housing shortage.52
By exempting newly constructed and renovated housing from rent
Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 346,93 N.E.2d 884, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876(1950) (owners of
rental property in New York did not have vested interest in any particular rent increase rule
and therefore were not constitutionally entitled to maximize their profits).
47. The inference probably drawn by the court was that since no legal rights were being
infringed, the plaintiffs' case amounted to a complaint that the act was undesirable
because he was not making enough money.
48. It is temporary because it treats the symptoms rather than the cause of the problem,
which is the housing shortage itself. See Blumberg, Robbins & Baar, The Emergence of
Second Generation Rent Controls, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 240 (1974).
49. The Act states that rents are "abnormally high." Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, § 1,
[19701 Mass. Acts g: Resolves 732.
50. Some housing experts have disputed this assertion, noting that "[M]any rent
controlled buildings in New York were in severe financial straits." I. LOWRY, REFORMING
RENT CONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (1970). See also Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing
Markets on Behalf of the Poor, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A
Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE
L.J. 1175 (1973).
In the context of housing codes, another method of regulating landlord-tenant
relationships, Friedman argues: "Since reform laws imposed costs on landlords without
reimbursing them in any way, and since no one expected or wanted rents to rise, it was
morally necessary to believe that rents were exorbitant and that costs could be absorbed
without giving up a fair return." L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 40. Others believe that
placing extra burdens on inner-city landlords causes housing abandonment: "The reality
is that the white owner in an urban core area increasingly is unable to rent his mortgage-
free structures to poor blacks and still derive necessary profit." G. STERNLIEB & R.
BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT 336 (1973).
51. E. OLSEN, THE EFFECTS OF A SIMPLE RENT CONTROL SCHEME IN A COMPETITIVE
MARKET 5 (1969); Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1081
(1972). These studies tend to show that if landlords cannot pass on their costs to tenants,
they would not be able to recoup their investment and would thus beleft with the option of
either selling or abandoning their property. In fact, the typical urban landlord is not
getting rich from his properties. See G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, supra note 50, at 53.
Contra, Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 275, 276 (1966).
52. F. HAYEK, supra note 3, at 344.
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control, the Administrator in Mayo tried to provide an incentive for
landlords to renovate low-income neighborhoods. The Supreme
Judicial Court, however, considered the problem of high rents and
housing supply for lower-income families to be more pressing than that
of urban decay.53 The dislocation problem is particularly acute in the
Boston area which has one of the lowest rental vacancy rates in the
United States54 as many high- and middle-income persons compete with
the poor for apartment space. 55 In Mayo the Dorchester Tenants'
Council (amicus curiae) argued that under the Administrator's decision,
all tenants of low- or middle-income neighborhoods were likely to be
evicted and priced out of their homes.56 This, however, has been averted
by the decision in Mayo. Whether the decision will increase the market
supply for lower-income persons is debatable.5 7
Mayo demonstrates the need for legislative specificity when dealing
with the conflicting policies of neighborhood renovation and the
economics of low-income housing management. The decision
represents a makeshift judicial policy decision forced by legislative
failure to resolve the conflict. It is a problem which every city must face
in redevelopment efforts and which must be met by balancing
competing policies.58 Rent control legislation is but one aspect and at
53. High rents and lack of low-income housing is a problem in Boston. See text at notes
54-55 infra. Deterioration and abandonment, however, are also considered to be part of the
problem and a cause of high rents. It was reported that three dwellings are abandoned daily
in Boston. See The Real Paper 5, June 25, 1975 (weekly Boston newspaper). The Mayo
court considered that the immediate loss of one building to high rent housing would add
to the problem. Local tenants organizations would appear to agree. See URBAN PLANNING
AID, INC., LESS RENT MORE CONTROL: A TENANT'S GUIDE TO RENT CONTROL IN
MASSACHUSETTS 99 (1973): "If the apartment is being converted into high rent housing
which you can't afford, the landlord is obviously violating the purpose of rent control -
unless he agrees to provide another apartment for you at a comparable rent."
54. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANALYSIS OF THE BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS HOUSING MARKET 6-7 (1971).
55. The presence of over 100,000 full time students living in the Boston area is partially
responsible for the low vacancy rate. M. LEVIN & N. ABEND, UNIVERSITY IMPACT ON
HOUSING SUPPLY AND RENTAL LEVELS IN THE CITY OF BOSTON (1970).
56. Brief for The Dorchester Tenants Council as Amicus Curiae at 6-10, Mayov. Boston
Rent Control Adm'r, -Mass. -, 314 N.E.2d 118 (1974). The urban renewal area in which
the apartments at issue were located had been a poor neighborhood, but because of the
renovation, is now one of the most desirable living places in Boston. The amicus curiae
feared that the Administrator's decision would set a precedent threatening the tenure of all
the low-income residents of Boston.
57. For a citation to sources on both sides of the rent control issue see Blumberg, Robbins
& Baar, supra note 48, at 249 n.126.
58. Some authorities believe that urban renovation can benefit both low-income ulban
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best represents an attempt to maintain the status quo. The broader
implications of urban problems require much more.
Anne C. Travis
resident-, and highcr-income Americans who choose to live or work in the city:
The migration of business, capital and people from central cities has left them with
immense physical, human and economic problems....
[Thosil who prefer to live in central cities or who lack the financial resources to
leave them, have an interest in strengthening the physical and economic
attractivene~s of the city. In fact, however, strengthening the central cities would
I×'ncfit the entire nation.
Kosolt, Incenties for Urban Apartment Construction, 32 Asi. J. EcoN. & SOCIOLOGY 295,
295-96 (1973).
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